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EXTERNAL SOURCES OF INNOVATIVE CAPABILITIES: THE






This paper explores the preferences that companies have as they use alternative
(quasi) external sources of innovative competencies such as strategic technology
alliances, mergers and acquisitions, or a mix of these. These alternatives are
studied in the context of distinct industrial, technological and international set-
tings during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. Different strategies followed by companies
and the role played by routinized sets of preferences are also taken into consider-
ation. The analysis demonstrates that these options are inﬂuenced by both differ-
ent environmental conditions and ﬁrm speciﬁc circumstances, such as those related
to protecting core businesses.

During the 1990s strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) became
well-known organizational instruments through which companies could increase
their market power, enter into new markets or enhance their capabilities. The
present contribution focuses on the basic research question: under which condi-
tions do companies prefer strategic technology alliances, M&As, or a combination
of these, as alternative external sources of innovative capabilities? The relevance
of our research for management studies is found in each of the major subjects
mentioned in this basic research question. Strategic alliances have grown in
numbers, expressing the importance that this form of organization has for the
strategies of many companies. M&As have already been known to companies 
for a much longer period of time. As far as innovation is concerned, the effect of
increased competition through new products and processes has been put on the
agenda of both practitioners and academics.
Contributions that pay attention to the preferences of companies with regard
to strategic alliances and M&As usually analyse the conditions that affect the pref-
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0022-2380erence for either alliances (joint ventures in most contributions) or M&As (Ingham
and Thompson, 1994; Pisano, 1991). Our paper complements the current under-
standing in several ways. We examine strategic alliances that refer to a group of
inter-ﬁrm modes of organization ranging from joint ventures to a variety of con-
tractual agreements. In particular non-equity based alliances have become more
important as it is estimated that in the late 1980s and ﬁrst half of the 1990s,
nearly 80 per cent of all strategic technology alliances were of a non-equity nature
(Hagedoorn, 1996). Our analysis also considers the preferences for alliances or
M&As for companies from different countries, whereas most studies concentrate
on companies from one or two countries. Furthermore, our analysis focuses on
‘technology’ alliances which, according to the literature (Mowery, 1988; Mytelka,
1991), form an important class of alliances.
In the above we introduced concepts such as strategic technology alliances,
M&As and innovative capabilities, for which it appears appropriate to give a short
description. Strategic technology alliances are those modes of inter-ﬁrm cooperation
for which a combined innovative activity or an exchange of technology is at least
part of an agreement. These alliances are expected to have an impact on the long-
term product–market combinations of the companies involved. M&As refer to
cases of joint activities where two, once separate companies are combined into
one company. This combination can refer to the merging of two more or less equal
companies, as well as to acquisitions where one company obtains majority own-
ership over another company. Innovative capability concerns the speciﬁc expertise
and competence related to the development and introduction of new processes
and products.
  
Contributions inspired by the resource-based theory of the ﬁrm (Barney, 1991;
Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1995) and the theory of dynamic ﬁrm capabilities
(Nelson, 1991) stress the importance of unique, innovative company capabilities
that create sustained performance differentials with other companies. Although 
we agree that these innovative capabilities are crucial to the company, we would
like to add that the efﬁcient use of external resources can also contribute to suc-
cessful renewal within the company. Following Cohen and Levinthal (1989), we
emphasize two important characteristics of the innovation process: the creation 
of new knowledge through endogenous R&D efforts, and the ability to adopt 
existing technologies developed by others. At the intersection of internal and exter-
nal technology development one ﬁnds strategic technology alliances where com-
panies internalize knowledge and capabilities that are at least partially exogenous
to them.
The attention for the role of strategic technology alliances as a mixture of both
internal and external learning tools is found in a growing number of contributions
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Hagedoorn, 1993; Mowery, 1988; Mytelka, 1991; Teece,
1992). Although differences do exist, all these contributions highlight the rela-
tionship between the increasing complexity of technological developments, that
goes beyond the capabilities of most individual companies, and the use of exter-
nal sources of technology through strategic technology alliances. In that context
external resources for innovative renewal can complement endogenous capa-
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shared resources for increased learning capacity and improved innovative skills
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhovn, 1996; Teece et al., 1997).
Apart from strategic technology alliances, full integration of innovative capa-
bilities of other companies through M&As remains another option. Contributions
by Arora and Gambardella (1990), Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), Hitt et al.
(1996) and Pisano (1991) point at the important role that M&As can play when
external sources of innovation have become relevant.
An understanding of the different options with regard to strategic technology
alliances and M&As can also be placed in the context of environmental inﬂuences
shaping the behaviour of companies, as indicated by the structural contingency
perspective (Donaldson, 1985; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) and the traditional
resource dependency view (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Then, environmental con-
ditions are understood to limit the choices that companies have with regard to 
creating and shaping the organizational form that is needed. Not only does this
suggest that organizations (including strategic technology alliances and M&As) are
embedded in their environment, it also suggests that companies have to take the
effectiveness of different forms of organization into account.
We envision that an understanding of the effect of environmental conditions,
inspired by a contingency perspective, and a perception of ﬁrm-speciﬁc condi-
tions, motivated by the resource-based theory or the theory of dynamic ﬁrm capa-
bilities, can aid in achieving a better understanding of preferences of companies.
With different technological and industrial environments we expect a preference
for strategic technology alliances and M&As or a mix of these alternatives. How-
ever, the logic that we suggest also allows a substantial degree of discretion with
companies to choose for strategic technology alliances or M&As once they have
been able to create safeguarded capabilities. The importance of understanding the
environment of companies, their different strategies and capabilities, as well as the
organizational choices they face, suggests the complexity that companies face in a
world of technological, organizational and managerial change (Bettis and Hitt,
1995).
Further elaboration on these themes is necessary for a more detailed under-
standing of particular properties of the preference for strategic technology
alliances and M&As. These topics are discussed in more detail, referring to spe-
ciﬁc research questions, in the following sections.
Sectoral Differences in the Preferences for M&As and Strategic Technology Alliances
The literature on different modes of organization suggests a sector-speciﬁc under-
standing of the association between, on the one hand, the level of technological
change in sectors of industry, and, on the other hand, the form of economic orga-
nization, be it integration through M&As or inter-ﬁrm linkages through strategic
technology alliances. This implies that the effect of technological change in indus-
tries could have different implications in terms of the alternative modes of orga-
nization that companies choose if they intend to acquire external innovative
capabilities.
Contributions by Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996), Harrigan (1985), Link
and Bauer (1989), Pisano (1991) and Teece (1992) demonstrate that the techno-
logical change that companies face is associated with a disproportionate pre-
ference for ﬂexible forms of organization such as alliances vis-à-vis integration.
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a large degree of learning and ﬂexibility, such as high-tech industries, will see a
prevalence for alliances, whereas M&As are dominant in the low-tech sectors 
of industry, where learning and ﬂexibility is less important than in high-tech 
industries.
Although these contributions differ with respect to the indicators used in the
actual analysis, the general picture that emerges is one in which there is an asso-
ciation between the level of technological change in sectors of industry and the
preference for particular modes of external appropriation of innovative compe-
tences. An explanation being offered is one in which under conditions of rapid
technological change, as in the case of high-tech industries, learning, organiza-
tional change and quick strategic response ask for ﬂexible forms of organization.
These ﬂexible forms of economic organization, such as strategic alliances, are
appropriate because new knowledge expires quickly and timely learning from 
partners appears more appropriate than control through formal and hierarchical
organization as such (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Hagedoorn, 1993).
However, under conditions of little technological change, as in so-called low-tech
industries, companies demonstrate a preference for formal and well institutional-
ized modes of organization and control, such as M&As, to be the most appropri-
ate form of external appropriation of innovative capabilities. Under these latter
conditions the external appropriation of innovative capabilities and the control
over these new capabilities is well assured by means of integration through M&As.
This understanding of the effect of environmental conditions goes back to orga-
nization theory inspired by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) which predicts that loose organizational structures, i.e. ﬂexible organiza-
tions such as alliances, are more effective and better in adapting to changes under
conditions of environmental uncertainty than integrated organizational structures
such as M&As.
Given the emphasis in this paper on technological change and company behav-
iour, the environmental conditions affecting the preference for M&As or strategic
technology alliances are expected to be found in different levels of technological
sophistication and crucial differences in technological opportunities in industries.
In the empirical literature (e.g. OECD, 1992, 1997) these different levels of tech-
nological sophistication and the differences in technological opportunities are 
identiﬁed for clusters of high-tech industries, medium-tech industries and 
low-tech industries.
[1] Following the logic for the association of the level of
technological change in industries with the preference for particular modes of the
appropriation as the main mechanism to transfer innovative capabilities, we expect
a disproportionate preference for strategic technology alliances in high-tech indus-
tries. We anticipate that in low-tech industries there is a disproportionate prefer-
ence for M&As as the main form of inter-ﬁrm relationships. As medium-tech
industries are by deﬁnition in between both other categories of industry sectors
we expect that this position is reﬂected in a mix of strategic alliances and M&As.
Hence:
Hypothesis 1a: For companies operating in high-tech sectors, strategic technol-
ogy alliances are preferred as a main mechanism for acquiring external innova-
tive capabilities.
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as a main mechanism for acquiring external innovative capabilities.
Hypothesis 1c: For companies operating in medium-tech sectors, the portfolio of
external sources for acquiring innovative capabilities is of a mixed character of
both strategic technology alliances and M&As.
Alternative Strategies of Companies Regarding Alliances and M&As
Apart from the effect of sectoral differences on the preferences of companies for
strategic technology alliances or M&As, there are also more ﬁrm-speciﬁc and
strategic conditions that inﬂuence the choices that companies make with regard
to the external appropriation of innovative capabilities. These strategic consider-
ations are particularly related to the question of whether companies should be
aware of the dangers of uncontrolled technology transfer to their partners in case
of alliances in their core business, i.e. those activities that concern their major ﬁelds
of industrial activity. If companies would need external sources of innovative capa-
bilities that are related to their core business, an M&A might be the preferred
option because this would, by deﬁnition, generate the necessary controls.
A number of contributions, from both a prescriptive and an analytical line of
work, suggest different options for companies (Chi, 1994; Ingham and Thompson,
1994;Roberts and Berry,1985;Teece,1986,1987).First,it is crucial for a company
that considers a strategic technology alliance or an M&A, to know whether this
refers to a core business activity or not. If the innovative capabilities of the other
party involved and the joint effort itself are not critical to a company because they
do not affect a core business, an alliance is the preferred option. M&As are sug-
gested in case the activities of (potential) partners are more important to the core
business of the company and when increasing contracting costs and risks are
involved.Then,the need for control over innovative capabilities related to core busi-
nesses suggests a formal mode of economic organization such as an M&A as the
most appropriate form for getting access to external sources of innovation. Hence:
Hypothesis 2: External sources of innovative capabilities of companies related to
core businesses will take the form of M&As; for non-core businesses they will
take the form of strategic alliances.
Another important factor that should be considered is the degree to which com-
panies are able to protect their own innovative capabilities. If a company would
engage in strategic technology alliances without having some protection over its
own innovative capabilities, it could run the risk of uncontrolled transfer of knowl-
edge and capabilities to its partner. It is in particular this risk of the unintended
transfer of knowledge, which goes beyond the formally agreed transfer in an
alliance, that has made some observers (Hamel, 1991; Reich and Mankin, 1984)
suspicious about the mutual beneﬁts of strategic technology alliances. The ability
of a ﬁrm to protect its innovative capabilities could be an important factor in
understanding the organizational choices that companies should make in order to
avoid the risk of unintended technology transfer.
If we understand a company’s core business as its major ﬁeld of interest, we
can follow Teece (1986, 1987) where the regime of appropriability or the degree
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patents or trade secrets, in seen as a crucial factor in understanding the choice that
companies make with regard to strategic technology alliances, M&As, or mixed
strategies.
[2] A strong regime of appropriability, that protects companies from quick
imitation, leads to a preference for strategic alliances because companies are safe-
guarded against opportunistic behaviour of partners. Little or no protection
through a weak regime of appropriability suggests that M&As are a better mech-
anism for appropriating sources of innovation because partners can be controlled
through ownership. Intermediate levels of protection will be related to mixed
strategies with both strategic technology alliances and M&As. The strength or
weakness of a regime of appropriability for an individual company is then de-
pendent on the degree to which a company can protect its innovative capabilities
from its competitors (Lee et al., 1995). The logic behind the strategic use of
different forms of economic organization implies that, controlling for sectoral 
differences, companies that have higher levels of protection than other companies
can form alliances with less risk than those companies that ﬁnd little protection
for their innovative capabilities. Hence:
Hypothesis 3a: External sources of innovative capabilities of companies related
to their core businesses will take the form of strategic technology alliances if
their particular regime of appropriability in these core activities is above the
industry average.
Hypothesis 3b: External sources of innovative capabilities of companies related
to their core businesses will take the form of M&As if their particular regime
of appropriability in these core activities is below the industry average.
Hypothesis 3c: External sources of innovative capabilities of companies related
to their core businesses will take the form of a mix of alliances and M&As if
their particular regime of appropriability in these core activities is at the indus-
try average.
Routines of Strategic Technology Alliance and M&A Strategies
Another aspect of company speciﬁc characteristics in the preference for alliances,
M&As or a mix refers to the routines that companies develop over a number of
years. In analogy to technological path dependencies (Arthur, 1989) we can under-
stand organizational strategies in terms of idiosyncratic behaviour and organiza-
tional path dependencies where companies reinforce their existing innovative
capabilities by concentrating on strategic technology alliances, M&As or a com-
bination of both as they are locked into a particular set of preferences. Osborn
and Hagedoorn (1997) state that from the perspective of institutionalization theory
it can be expected that companies search for ‘rules of conduct’ with regard to dif-
ferent forms of organization that are not only embedded in particular industrial
settings but that are also copied over time as they become institutionalized within
companies.
Research by Harrigan and Newman (1990) indicates that the propensity of ﬁrms
to seek alliances is an important characteristic of differences with respect to the
behaviour of ﬁrms in this context. Following Powell et al. (1996) we expect ex-
perience with strategic alliances to have a positive effect on the choice for alliances
172 .   . 
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002as a mechanism for the external appropriation of innovative capabilities. The same
can be expected for the history that ﬁrms have with regard to M&As. Trautwein
(1990) found that a developed set of organizational routines with a preference for
M&As will make ﬁrms which have established these routines, increasingly engage
in M&A formation. In other words, routines of alliance or M&A activities in the
past affect the degree to which ﬁrms are momentarily active in forming strategic
technology alliances and/or M&As. Hence:
Hypothesis 4: The history of companies, in terms of routines with a preference
for M&As, strategic technology alliances, or a mix, determines their current
preference for each of these modes or a combination of them, as a main strate-
gic mechanism for acquiring innovative capabilities.
 
Sample
The population of companies that we analysed consisted of a group of 135 large
US, Canadian and European companies. We did not include Japanese and Korean
companies in this study because most of these companies are of a widely diversi-
ﬁed nature, ranging from raw materials to consumer products and ﬁnancial and
other services, which makes it impossible to denote their core business or relate
them to any sort of industry classiﬁcation. An initial screening of US, Canadian
and European companies from the Business Week and Fortune 500 lists of inter-
national companies was set up to ﬁnd those companies that had formed a mini-
mum of ﬁve strategic technology alliances and/or M&As during the period
1993–94. For obvious reasons companies with either strategic technology alliances
or M&As were not relevant for this particular line of research. For companies with
less than ﬁve alliances and/or M&As we found it too precarious to discern whether
they followed a strategy that could be characterized as mainly oriented towards
strategic technology alliances, M&A, or a mixed strategy.
[3] Under these restric-
tions a sample of 153 companies remained as the population to be studied; 18
companies from this sample were excluded from the statistical analysis due to
missing values.
As mentioned above the sample consists of large ﬁrms that have established
strategic technology alliances, M&As or both. There is a well-established body of
literature on the prominent role that, in particular, large ﬁrms play in form-
ing strategic alliances (see Berg et al., 1982; Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1995;
Ghemawat et al., 1986; Hagedoorn, 1995; Mowery, 1988; Mytelka, 1991). Re-
search by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), Hoskisson and Hitt (1994), Ingham 
and Thompson (1994), Mueller (1986) and Salter and Weinhold (1979) indicates
that in general the same holds for M&As where large ﬁrms are the acquirers and
small ﬁrms are acquired.
[4]
Data Sources
The data on strategic technology alliances and characteristics of companies
involved in these alliances is derived from the MERIT-CATI data bank on strate-
gic technology alliances. The database currently covers the period between 1970
and 1994 and contains information on nearly 13,000 strategic technology
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and technology journals for each sector of industry and may ﬁelds of technology.
Strategic technology alliances are deﬁned as the establishment of common inter-
ests between independent (industrial) partners which are not connected through
(majority) ownership. Although an alliance can cover a number of activities, the
transfer of technology or the undertaking of joint research has to be part of the
arrangement. Mere production or marketing alliances are excluded. Examples of
strategic alliances are joint research pacts, joint development agreements, R&D
contracts, (mutual) second sourcing agreements and joint ventures with technol-
ogy sharing or an R&D programme. The differentiation between strategic
alliances and other forms of cooperation in this data bank is described exten-
sively in Hagedoorn (1993). As the share of joint ventures in the total number of
strategic technology alliances had dropped to about 20 per cent in the 1990s
(Hagedoorn, 1996), the data for joint ventures had to be combined with the con-
tractual alliances to avoid statistical problems related to small numbers.
Key characteristics of companies, such as size and core business, were imported
from Securities Data ﬁles (see next paragraph). Within the CATI database there
are 65 classiﬁcations with respect to sub-sectors and sub-ﬁelds of technology that
can also be identiﬁed in terms of SIC codes and patent classiﬁcations (see Appen-
dix A). For the purpose of the present analysis, information was used regarding
the industrial sectors in which companies operate, their core business, the year of
establishment of the strategic technology alliance and the industry afﬁliation of
the alliance.
The second data bank provides information on M&As. This data bank is the
property of Securities Data and can be used via on-line access. It contains infor-
mation on about 125,000 worldwide M&As for the period 1980–94. This infor-
mation is arranged in several data ﬁles. The relational form of the database
facilitates the linking of these data ﬁles to each other and also to ﬁles in other data
banks. Within the M&As database there is information on the year the M&A was
established and on the acquirer, the target, the parent acquirer and the parent
target ﬁrm. The industry information is provided is SIC codes of the aquiree and
acquirer.
As we analysed the preference for strategic technology alliances, M&As, or 
a mix, we had to select a population of M&As that could be expected to have 
a similar strategic and technological focus as strategic technology alliances.
Chatterjee (1986) established that completely unrelated and conglomerate M&As
are created because of ﬁnancial synergies from a perspective of portfolio manage-
ment for which strategic, operational and technological synergies are implausible.
For related horizontal and vertical M&As these strategic, operational and techno-
logical synergies, based on economies of scale and scope, were found to be most
relevant. Following this line of research, a selection of M&As from the Securities
Data data bank was made to denote vertically and horizontally related M&As of
the companies in the sample. M&As with companies from service industries, where
diffusion of innovations might be relevant but where technical innovation itself is
of limited relevance, were excluded. An exception was made for M&As with com-
panies from service industries that do have a proﬁle of endogenous innovative
capabilities, such as software and engineering services and R&D services, which
were included (see Appendix B). For instance, we combined M&As in computer
related services and R&D and testing services with M&As in the appropriate high-
174 .   . 
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002tech sectors. M&As in engineering services were joined with M&As in other
medium-tech industries. Furthermore, using the brief description of the objectives
of the M&As in the Securities Data data bank, we selected those M&As for which
innovation, R&D or technology were mentioned in the description of the indi-
vidual M&A. Following the above we developed a group of M&As that are com-
parable in scope to the group of strategic technology alliances. The relevant
sectors, however, represent not only high-tech sectors but also medium-tech and
low-tech sectors (see Appendix A).
Finally, the patent data refers to US patent data obtained from the US Depart-
ment of Commerce, which covers the period 1992–93. Although this US data
could imply a bias in favour of US companies and against non-US ﬁrms, the group
of non-US companies in this study represents a group of very large, international
ﬁrms which are known to patent worldwide. Furthermore, the innovation litera-
ture (for instance, Patel and Pavitt, 1991) suggests several other reasons to take US
patents as an indicator. Frequently mentioned are the importance of the US
market, the ‘real’ patent protection offered by US authorities, and the level of tech-
nological sophistication of the US market which makes it almost compulsory for
non-US companies to ﬁle patents in the USA.
Variables and Measures
Sectors of industry. We deﬁned sectors as high-tech, medium-tech, or low-tech fol-
lowing the standard OECD sector classiﬁcation (OECD, 1997) and similar classi-
ﬁcations that feature in many innovation studies (Hagedoorn, 1993; OECD, 1992;
Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Verspagen, 1995) which group sectors as to their level
of technological sophistication in terms of R&D intensity. Following this classiﬁ-
cation, companies in our analysis that are in pharmaceuticals (with an R&D inten-
sity of 10.5 per cent), information technology (11.5 per cent), aerospace/defence
(15.0 per cent) are in high-tech industries; instrumentation (5.1 per cent), chemi-
cals/plastics (3.4 per cent) and automotive (3.4 per cent) are taken as medium-tech
industries; food and beverages (0.3 per cent), metals (0.6 per cent), oil and gas (0.9
per cent) are low-tech industries. The ﬁgures in brackets are R&D intensity indi-
cators, R&D expenditures as a percentage of value of production for 1990, as
found in OECD (1997). As shown by these R&D intensity indicators this selection
procedure leads to three clearly different groups of sectors for companies in the
analysis.
Regime of appropriability or patent intensity of core businesses. The regime of appropri-
ablity is measured through the patent intensity of companies. We are aware that
patents are not the only means of protection against opportunistic behaviour and
that the relevance of patenting differs with regard to sectors (Bettis and Hitt, 1995;
Teece, 1987; Winter, 1987). Winter (1987) presents a quantitative analysis of dif-
ferent levels of patent protection for a large number of industries. However, this
overview of the effectiveness ratings for patent protection also indicates that for
most industries that we analyse, patents are still found to be effective or moder-
ately effective. Other contributions to the literature support the notion of patent-
ing as still one of the most effective means of protecting a ﬁrm’s innovative
capabilities, which also indicates the ability of companies to introduce new prod-
ucts and processes (Napolitano and Sirilli, 1990; Patel and Pavitt, 1995). Further-
more the patent indicator is the only measure that enables researchers to make a
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rather vague, or copyrights that are only relevant in a limited number of sectors.
Moreover, given similarities of patent protection within industries and in one
leading nation (the USA), the role of patent protection for companies in similar
industries does suggest that patent intensity indicates the degree to which par-
ticular companies can protect their innovative capabilities, demonstrating their 
relative position with regard to regimes of appropriability (see also note 2). The
use of patent intensity as an indicator of strength in product development also
allows us to control for different innovative capabilities.
The patent intensity of companies during the period 1992–93 is calculated as the
patent intensity of a ﬁrm in its core business (number of patents divided by a ﬁrm’s
turnover in its core business) adjusted for the average patent intensity of ﬁrms in
our sample that operate in the same sector, to take sectoral differences with respect
to patenting behaviour into account. This patent intensity ratio of companies is
divided by the sectoral standard deviation.
[5]This generates a normalized range with
an average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Firms with a score of less than -0.5
have a low patent protection, those with a score higher than 0.5 are patent in-
tensive ﬁrms, and those with a score between -0.5 and 0.5 take an intermediate 
position. In order to determine the core business of the companies, we used the
information of the SIC codes of their main business, usually at a combined SIC
three-digit level, as registered in the Securities Data data set (see Appendix A).
Strategic technology alliances and M&As in core businesses. For each company we calcu-
lated the share of its strategic technology alliances that are undertaken in its core
business and the share of its M&As that take place in its core business during the
years 1992 and 1993. Core businesses were determined in a similar way as with
the previously discussed measure, using the information of the SIC codes of their
main business, usually at a combined SIC three-digit level, as registered in the
Securities Data data set (see Appendix A).
Routines of strategic technology alliances and M&A strategies. The history of companies,
in terms of routines with a preference for M&As, strategic technology alliances,
or a mix was calculated by applying the following set of rules to denote the pref-
erence for the individual years 1985–92. The strategic technology alliances of a
ﬁrm are set against its combined number of strategic technology alliances and
M&As in each year. This percentage is set against the average for its sector to
account for sectoral differences in the propensity to engage in external relation-
ships. Next, this ratio is divided by the sectoral standard deviation. This generates
a normalized range with an average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Firms
with a score of less than -0.5 have a preference for M&As, those with a score
between -0.5 and 0.5 have a mixed strategy, and those with a score higher than
0.5 concentrate on alliances, in a speciﬁc year. After we determined the preferred
strategy for every single year, we calculated how many times companies used a
particular strategy. The overall distribution of these different strategies for each
individual company determines the value of the variables for strategic technology
alliance routines, M&A routines and mixed routines.
International differences. We controlled for differences between US and non-US com-
panies using a dummy variable to indicate whether companies are registered as
176 .   . 
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002US companies or not (USA dummy). Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994) found
that European and US ﬁrms are not different with regard to the degree to which
they engage in strategic technology alliances if one controls for size of companies.
However, the literature (e.g. Odagiri and Hase, 1989; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992)
does suggest differences with respect to the (history of) M&A behaviour of Euro-
pean and US companies, as the latter are known to be more engaged in M&As
than their international competitors.
Size of companies. We also controlled for size differences in the sample of compa-
nies because, as explained above, previous research indicates that size does play a
role in this context as the intensity of both partnering and M&As appears to
increase with size of companies. However, there is little to be said about what effect
size will have on the choice for each of the alternative strategies. The average size
of companies during the years 1992 and 1993 is measured by means of the logn
of worldwide sales. Logarithms are taken to correct for a small number of very
large companies in our sample.
The preference for strategic technology alliances, M&As or a mix. The dependent variable
in our analysis refers to the preference of companies for strategic technology
alliances, M&As or a mix of both. The set of rules applied to measure the rou-
tines of strategic technology alliances, M&As or mixed strategies, discussed above,
is also used to determine the preference for strategic technology alliances, M&As
or a mix. This dependent variable covers the years 1993 and 1994.
Finally, it is important to note that conditions of uncertainty do not only relate
to technological development but also to the degree of internationalization that
might affect the preference for certain modes of organization. Controlling for 
different levels of technological change in sectors, domestic external relationships
could be expected to be dominated by strategic technology alliances. M&As could
be applied the more a company engages in the internationally distant external
appropriation of innovative capabilities (Dunning, 1993). However, we expect that
the population of companies under study is already that internationalized, and,
within the context of the present study, we can assume that their level of inter-




As most of our research questions imply that we have a dependent variable with
three categories, we apply multinomial logit analysis (Limdep 7.0).
[7] As mentioned
above, the period that we analyse refers to the period 1992 and 1993 for the inde-
pendent variables, with the exception of the routines of ﬁrms with respect to
alliances and M&As, for which the period 1985–92 was chosen. The short period
of two years for all but one variable was taken because with longer periods the choice
companies made with respect to M&As could affect the measurement of indepen-
dent variables, such as those related to innovative capabilities and core businesses,
because these very companies would change due to their M&As. For the dependent
variable (the preference for strategic technology alliances, M&As or a mix) we took
the period 1993–94 to allow for a short time-lag with the independent variables.
Hypothesis 2 will be tested separately with a t-test for paired samples to compare
differences between two groups. This separate test is necessary because Hypothe-
     177
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002sis 2 refers to the preference for either strategic technology alliances or M&As.
This paired t-test allows us to test the hypothesis that the average number of M&As
(as a percentage of the total number of M&As) that is found in the core business
of companies is signiﬁcantly higher than the average number of strategic 
technology alliances (as a percentage of the total number of alliances) in the core
business of companies. The period 1992–93 is identical to the period for most of
the independent variables in the other test.

We will ﬁrst, brieﬂy, present some descriptive data on the population. As men-
tioned above, there are 135 companies in the ﬁnal analysis; 31 per cent of these
are non-US companies, the others are US ﬁrms. Fifty-ﬁve per cent of the com-
panies are found in high-each sectors, 31 per cent are mainly active in medium-
tech sectors and 14 per cent are categorized as low tech companies. Thirty-seven
per cent of the companies in this population follow an alliance strategy, 37 per
cent concentrate their external activities on M&As and about 26 per cent follow
a mixed strategy.
A multinomial logit model is used to analyse which factors determine the prob-
ability that ﬁrms prefer one of the three strategies. The estimation results are pre-
sented in tables I and II. The ﬁrst two columns show the estimated coefﬁcients
and z-scores for the probability that a ﬁrm takes on an M&A or mixed strategy,
respectively, with the alliance strategy as reference state. The third column shows
the estimation coefﬁcients and z-scores for the probability that a ﬁrm takes on a
mixed strategy, with the M&A strategy as the reference state (it contains the dif-
ferences between the coefﬁcients for M&A and mixed strategies and correspond-
ing z-scores). This column shows the effects of variables on the probability that a
ﬁrm takes on a mixed strategy and not an M&A strategy.
Our initial analysis detected strong multicollinearity of the variables for rou-
tines with the other variables. Therefore, the effect of routines (Hypothesis 4) is
tested separately. The results of this second analysis are shown in table II. Table
I shows the effects of the other variables. Some additional information is presented
in table III, where the actual group means are given.
The results of the multinomial logit analysis indicate some signiﬁcant differ-
ences with regard to the differentiation of low-tech, medium-tech and high-tech
sectors and the preference for strategic technology alliances, M&As or a mixed
option. Companies that prefer strategic technology alliances over M&As are pri-
marily active in high-tech sectors; companies that favour M&As over alliances are
mostly found in the low-tech sectors (see tables I and III). Companies that have a
mixed strategy preference over M&As are primarily active in medium-tech sectors;
companies that have a mixed strategy preference over alliances, however, cannot
be assigned to medium-tech sectors. These results conﬁrm Hypotheses 1a and 1b
and generate partial support for Hypothesis 1c.
The expected effects of regimes of appropriability on preferences with respect
to strategic technology partnerships, M&As or mixed portfolios (Hypotheses 3a–c)
could not be detected. The variables indicating different degrees of patent inten-
sity in core activities all generate clearly insigniﬁcant results (see table I).
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Table I. Multinomial logit model of the probability that compa-
nies have an alliance, mixed or M&A strategy (experience variables
excluded from the analysis)
Reference state M&A Mixed Mixed
Alliance Alliance M&A
Constant 11.50 2.86 -8.63
(3.24)*** (0.85) (-2.39)**
USA dummy -0.35 -0.22 0.13
(-0.63) (-0.41) (0.23)
High-tech sectors -3.92 -0.83 3.09
(-4.18)*** (-0.76) (3.28)***
Medium-tech  -1.73 0.00 1.73
sectors (1.91)* (0.00) (1.94)*
High patenting -0.76 -0.83 -0.07
intensity (-1.12) (-1.25) (-1.10)
Medium patenting -0.88 -0.72 0.16
intensity (-1.64) (-1.40) (0.29)
Size -0.52 -0.13 0.39
(-2.62)*** (-0.70) (1.90)*
Observations 135 Chi-squared = 40.06*** Percentage of cases
correctly classiﬁed = 53 per cent
Notes:
z-scores in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Coefﬁcients in the third column are differences between the coefﬁcients in
the ﬁrst and second columns. The omitted variables are low-tech sectors
and low patenting intensity.
Table II. Multinomial logit model of the probability that compa-
nies have an alliance, mixed or M&A strategy (routine variables)
Reference state M&A Mixed Mixed
Alliance Alliance M&A
Constant -0.49 -2.12 -1.63
(-0.57) (-1.86)* (-1.41)
Alliance routines -0.67 -0.03 0.64
(-2.76)*** (-0.15) (2.32)**
Mixed routines -0.08 0.46 0.54
(-0.47) (2.70)*** (2.95)***
M&A routines 0.54 -0.56 -0.084
(3.25)*** (-2.01)** (-0.47)
Observations 135 Chi-squared = 100.20*** Percentage of cases
correctly classiﬁed = 70 per cent
Notes:
z-scores in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Coefﬁcients in the third column are differences between the coefﬁcients in
the ﬁrst and second columns.There are highly signiﬁcant differences with respect to the history of com-
panies in terms of strategic technology alliances, a mix of strategic technology
alliances and M&As, or a long-term propensity to engage primarily in M&As,
indicating a particular preference for a long-term strategy based on strategic tech-
nology alliances, M&As or a mix (see table II). This indicates that Hypothesis 4 
is conﬁrmed by our analysis.
As far as country differences are concerned, our analysis does not generate sig-
niﬁcant differences between US and European companies (see USA dummy) with
respect to their propensity to choose primarily strategic alliances or M&As.
However, the other control variable, size, does show a signiﬁcant effect as the 
preference for M&As decreases with the size of companies.
The results of the t-test for paired samples (see table IV), indicate signiﬁcant 
differences between the average scores on core business-related strategic technol-
ogy alliances and the average score on core business M&As, which conﬁrms
Hypothesis 3.

A summary of the support for the hypotheses tested in this paper is given in table
V. This study demonstrates that the industrial and technological environment in
which companies operate plays a role in explaining why companies have a certain
preference for more ﬂexible forms of organization such as strategic technology
alliances, a mix of these alliances and integration, or straightforward integration
by means of M&As. The more companies operate in high-tech sectors, such as
180 .   . 
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002
Table III. Group means classiﬁed according to the preferences for different means of external appro-
priation of innovative capabilities (dependent variable)
Dependent Low-tech Medium-tech High-tech Low patent Medium patent High patent
variable sector sector sector intensity intensity intensity
Alliance 0.04000 0.20000 0.76000 0.30000 0.48000 0.22000
preference
Mixed 0.05714 0.31400 0.62900 0.45714 0.40000 0.14286
preference
M&A 0.28000 0.42000 0.30000 0.44000 0.40000 0.16000
preference
Total 0.13333 0.31100 0.55600 0.39259 0.42963 0.17778
Alliance Mixed M&A Size USA
routine routine routine dummy
Allance 1.12000 1.20000 3.86000 3.01881 0.76000
preference
Mixed 2.82857 2.80000 1.65714 1.96292 0.68571
preference
M&A 5.24000 1.06000 0.42000 2.47237 0.62000
preference
Total 3.08889 1.56296 2.01481 2.54267 0.68889pharmaceuticals, information technology and aerospace/defence, the more they
have a disproportionate preference for strategic technology alliances. With low
levels of the technology intensity of sectors, such as in food and beverages,
metals and oil and gas, M&As become the main mechanism for the integration of
external sources of innovation. In medium-tech industries, such as the automo-
tive, instruments and chemical industries, mixed strategies are preferred.
Against this background we can also consider the question whether companies
prefer the option of integration through M&As, if external sources of innovative
capabilities affect their core businesses, or whether they choose strategic technol-
ogy alliances for their core businesses. The literature, both from an analytical and
a prescriptive perspective, seems to suggest that companies should play it safe and
use M&As for core businesses in order to avoid uncontrolled technology transfer.
Strategic technology alliances should be applied for other activities, that can, of
course, eventually become core businesses. Our analysis suggests that most com-
panies operate rationally, that is, conform to what theory would expect. They
prefer M&As as external sources of innovation for their core businesses and they
demonstrate a higher preference for strategic technology alliances in their other
businesses.
     181
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002
Table IV. Results of the t-test for paired samples of companies with core business related strategic
technology alliances or core business related M&As
Variable No. of pairs Corr 2-tail sign Mean SD SE mean
Core business 0.6308 0.439 0.048
alliances
82 0.36 0.001
Core business 0.7518 0.315 0.035
M&As
Paired differences
Mean SD SE of mean t-value df 2-tail sign
-0.121 0.438 0.048 -2.5 81 0.014
95% CI (-0.217, -0.025).
Table V. Overview of support for the hypotheses
Hypotheses Support
1a High-tech sectors preference for alliances Yes
1b Low-tech sectors preference for M&As Yes
1c Medium-tech sectors preference for mix Partial
2 Core business – M&A; none core – alliances Yes
3a Strong regime of appropriability – alliances No
3b Weak regime of appropriability – M&As No
3c Average regime of appropriability – mix No
4 Routines drive choice YesThis issue of the relationship between the degree to which companies are able
to protect their internal innovative capabilities through a particular regime of
appropriability, on the one hand, and their preference for each of the three options
with regard to the use of external sources of innovative capabilities, on the other
hand, is more problematic. As far as our analysis is concerned there seems to be
no relationship between the degree to which companies are able to protect their
innovations and their preferences for strategic technology alliances, M&As or a
mix. We still think that the regime of appropriability is an important strategic
factor that will enter into the equation if companies decide what precise form of
external relationships they prefer. However, it seems that a somewhat aggregated
level of analysis, as in this study, using only patenting data is probably less appro-
priate for an analysis that includes the regime of appropriability. In-depth studies
of particular cases with different case-speciﬁc indicators, as found in Teece (1987),
are in all likelihood more adequate to illustrate the strategic importance of the
regime of appropriability in the context of attempts to augment a ﬁrm’s inno-
vative capabilities through different external sources.
However, the importance of ﬁrm speciﬁc capabilities, but not in terms of rou-
tinized behaviour that has become institutionalized within the ﬁrm, is found to
have a very signiﬁcant effect with regard to organizational preferences of compa-
nies. Our analysis indicates that, as with so many other aspects of their behaviour,
companies seem to stay with certain routines. Companies that have a relatively
long history of systematic preference for one of the options for the external appro-
priation of innovative capabilities seem to stick to their preference. We think this
indicates that companies are quite satisﬁed with their past preferences and that
these preferences for particular modes of external appropriation of innovative
capabilities ﬁt quite well with their overall innovation strategy. It seems unlikely
that companies simply maintain their routines without considering alternatives.
This group of large companies in particular can be expected to be aware of the
alternative options.

As far as questions about the industry (environment) versus company (strategy)
effects are concerned, our study supports those approaches that stress the rele-
vance of both company-speciﬁc and environmental factors (Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1996). It suggests a moderate resource-based theory of the ﬁrm in
its understanding of organizational properties where, as also suggested by the clas-
sical resource dependency approach, alternatives in organizational forms have to
be evaluated against the background of environmental conditions. Our ﬁndings
also support contributions from a variety of theoretical approaches, such as those
that combine elements of evolutionary economic theory with an understanding of
the effects of strategic behaviour, theories developed from an organizational learn-
ing and technology perspective, and work done in the context of institutional orga-
nization theory that pays attention to the impact of environmental conditions on
alternative forms of organization.
What we witness in the present analysis is, on the one hand, environmental con-
ditions that inﬂuence the general preferences of companies, and, on the other
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Although ﬁrms could use a ‘random’ portfolio of options, in terms of any mix of
strategic technology alliances and M&As, there is a clear pattern for the group of
large companies that we investigated. There are distinct environmental contin-
gencies in terms of the level of technology intensity of sectors in which com-
panies operate. With increasing technology intensity of sectors of industry, the
ﬂexibility found in alliances, with the opportunity this provides to learn through
loosely structured agreements, appears to have become very important. Formal
control through M&As is very important in low-tech sectors.
[8] However, these 
routinized preferences are inﬂuenced by the degree to which strategic technology
alliances and M&As are related to the core businesses of companies. If the exter-
nal sourcing of innovative capabilities comes closer to the core business of com-
panies, the role of integration becomes more important because in that case M&As
provide greater control than strategic technology alliances. This does not imply
that companies completely reverse the distribution of alliances and M&As.
However, increased control through a greater input from integrative modes still
appears useful if companies want to protect their interests in external relationships
affecting their core business that will constitute their competitive strength for some
time to come.
The above also clariﬁes how one can explain the many examples of well-known
high-tech companies that are engaged in a relatively large number of M&As. Our
analysis demonstrates that in general companies in high-tech industries have, com-
pared to companies in other sectors, a disproportionate preference for strategic
alliances. This does not imply that they are not engaged in M&As activities,
however; more than in other industries their many alliances outnumber their many
M&As. Moreover, our analysis indicates that in high-tech industries companies also
seem to prefer M&As if the external appropriation of innovative capabilities is
related to their core business.
It is obvious that all of this has to be seen in the light of certain limitations of
this study. A brief discussion of these limitations enables us to introduce some
interesting topics for further study. First, our study refers only to the ﬁrst half
of the 1990s. Recent developments in the growth of M&As in high-tech 
industries (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) might indicate certain changes in the behav-
iour of companies in these industries that are worth studying in future research.
Second, subsequent work could study the role of M&As and strategic alliances 
in a larger model than the one applied in this study, where the interacting 
effects of both internal and external innovation and governance mechanisms on
company performance are examined. Recent contributions such as Hitt et al.
(1996) seem an interesting starting point for such a broader setting. Third,
more in-depth analysis of different forms of M&As and alliances in terms of their
relatedness to different businesses at a dis-aggregated level within the company
could provide more in-depth understanding of the effect of M&As and alliances
on innovation and company performance. Such detailed studies would probably
require survey research of companies to replace or complement database 
research such as undertaken in the current study. However, the results of our
research present the broader picture regarding alternative organizational 
strategies and different industrial settings against which this subsequent research
can be placed.
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[1] As explained in more detail in the section on ‘Variables and measures’, this differen-
tiation into high-tech, medium-tech and low-tech is not only theoretically recon-
structed but also supported by empirical evidence regarding different ‘clusters’ of
sectors according to their R&D intensity.
[2] In Teece (1987, pp. 202–7) these alternative considerations are presented in detailed
decision ﬂow charts, an integration calculus and a comparison of contract and in-
tegration strategies that can help companies make decisions given different regimes of
appropriability.
[3] We do admit that the number of ﬁve alliances or M&As is somewhat arbitrary, but to
include companies that have only one or two alliances or M&As in two years and then
to interpret this as a ‘strategy’ seems somewhat awkward in the light of the relatively
large number of alliances and/or M&As that other companies have.
[4] We do not deny that small and medium sized ﬁrms can play an active role in creat-
ing both strategic technology alliances and M&As. However, with the exception of the
semiconductor and biotechnology industries, it seems that these smaller companies are
less active in the ﬁeld of alliances and M&As than larger companies.
[5] We did not follow the well-known practice to use the logn of patents to control for the
possible skewness in the data because some companies did not have patents and using
the logn in these cases would lead to missing values.
[6] Also, the exact degree to which companies in this population are internationally diver-
siﬁed is unknown for most of the European companies due to a lack of reliable data.
[7] During our research we also applied discriminant analysis and standard regression
analysis as additional methods. As we have a number of dummy variables in our analy-
sis, this creates some methodological problems for the discriminant analysis with regard
to the assumption of multivariate normality. There are some solutions to these prob-
lems, for example, the size of both the sample and each of the ﬁnal categorizations is
quite large, one can control for outliers and check whether the correlation of the
dummy variables with the other independent variables in each classiﬁed group in the
discriminant analysis is of the same order of magnitude. When we used discriminant
analysis these checks suggested that this method could be used. As far as regression
analysis is concerned, we used the share of strategic technology alliances in the total
number of external sources of innovation as the dependent variable. In that case that
dependent variable would not be normally distributed as we have an upper limit of 1
and a lower limit of 0. Again it is open to debate whether regression analysis is appro-
priate in the context of this research. Given these methodological problems, we
decided that multinomial logit is most appropriate for our current research and we
only report the ﬁndings of this logit analysis. However, the ﬁndings for both discrim-
inant analysis and regression analysis were identical to the logit analysis with the same
variables generating signiﬁcant results. Having tested the hypotheses with three dif-
ferent statistical techniques that generate similar results, this suggests that our ﬁndings
are quite robust.
[8] As indicated by one of the reviewers, the preeminence of strategic alliances or M&As
might be caused by herd behaviour in certain industries. Once the industry leaders
demonstrate a certain preference, others will gradually follow.
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s,    
Industries Patent classiﬁcations
High tech
Drugs Drugs and medicines
Information technology Ofﬁce computing and accounting machines
Communications equipment and electronic components
Electronic components and accessories and communications equipment




Instrumentation Professional and scientiﬁc instruments
Automotive Motor vehicles and other transportation equipment, except aircraft
Chemicals/plastics Chemicals, except drugs and medicines
Basic industrial inorganic and organic chemistry
Industrial inorganic chemistry
Industrial organic chemistry
Plastic materials and synthetic resins
Agricultural chemicals
All other chemicals
Soaps, detergents, cleaners, perfumes, cosmetics and toiletries
Paints, varnishes, lacquers, enamels and allied products
Miscellaneous chemical products
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products
Low tech
Food and beverages Food and kindred products
Metals Primary metals
Primary ferrous products
Primary and secondary non-ferrous metals
Oil and gas Petroleum and natural gas extraction and reﬁning
 :     ( )   
 s 
4 – Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
5 – Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade
6 – Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
7 – Services
• Except 737: Computer Programming, Data Processing and Other Com-
puter Related Services
8 – Services
• Except 8711: Engineering Services
• Except 873: Research, Development, and Testing Services
9 – Public Administration, and Non-classiﬁable Establishments
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